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PAY OR PLAY PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION
Forty-seven million Americans lack health insurance, and public opinion
polls demonstrate that the electorate is increasingly interested in government
action to expand access to health care.1 Much of the debate has focused on
comprehensive national legislation to reform our health care system, but over the
last five years state and local governments have taken important steps to ensure
that their own citizens can obtain needed health care services. One type of state
law, "pay or play" health care reform, places burdens on employers in order to
expand the number of adults that receive health care through their workplace. In
particular, seven state and local governments have adopted laws that require
employers to either "pay" a tax that is used to provide public health care services
or "play" by providing health insurance for their employees.2
These state and local reform projects from Massachusetts to San Francisco
stand out as examples of at least potential success in a broken and deeply
fractured health care system. As national leaders work to craft a federal reform
project, the Massachusetts experiment is frequently cited as an example from
which important lessons can be drawn. Reformers across the country continue to
point to these efforts in their attempts to expand coverage in new places.3 But, at
the same time, a largely unrelated federal statute places enormous obstacles in
front of this major strategy toward achieving universal health insurance.
These state and local programs are threatened by federal preemption under
section 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).4 The
language of ERISA explicitly disallows a broad cross-section of state law
affecting employer-provided benefits, which affects state pay or play laws in
1. See Kaiser Family Foundation, Kaiser Health Tracking Poll - April 2009,
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/posr042309pkg.cfm (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
2. The seven jurisdictions include Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Vermont, New York
City, San Francisco, and New York's Suffolk County. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 393-2
(LexisNexis 2004); Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2005 Md. Laws 3 (codified as amended at
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (LexisNexis 2007); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§
8.5-101 to -107 (LexisNexis 2006)); An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable
Health Care, 2006 Mass. Acts 77; An Act Relating to Health Care Affordability for Vermonters,
2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 455; N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 22-506 (2009), available at
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us (follow "Laws of New York" hyperlink, then follow "ADC"
hyperlink, then navigate to Title 22, Section 506); S.F., CAL., HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE
§ 14.1-14.8 (2007); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (describing the Suffolk County law).
3. Dawson Bell, Democrats Test Water for Ballot Proposals, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 23,
2009, at A8, available at 2009 WLNR 15669318.
4. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
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profound ways. Indeed, since its enactment in 1974, section 514-which contains
ERISA's broad preemption clause and complicated savings language-has
become a case study in unintended legislative consequences.5 In 2006, courts
concluded that a Maryland pay or play law was preempted by ERISA.6 Today,
states continue to experiment with pay or play schemes designed to avoid ERISA
preemption, and lawsuits that threaten their viability continue to make their way
through the federal courts.
At the time of this writing, the Obama administration and the Democratic
Congress appear well on their way toward achieving comprehensive national
health care legislation.7 But national legislation will inevitably leave profound
gaps in health care coverage-and we should look to states and localities to solve
the remaining problems. One proposal circulated in the summer of 2009, for
example, involved a federal mandate on individuals that required them to obtain
health insurance, but no requirement on employers to contribute to their
employees' coverage. 8 Of course, absent an amendment to ERISA, many state
and local policymakers will continue to fear preemption and will face severe
design constraints.
The negotiation of a national health insurance package provides an excellent
opportunity to amend ERISA section 514. Scaling back ERISA preemption of
state and local schemes is essential to achieving broad insurance coverage. More
importantly, many of ERISA's important stakeholders-unions, employers,
indemnity insurers, and HMOs-will already be at the table to hammer out the
particulars of the national health insurance bill. As this window of opportunity
opens, this Note discusses the options for "fixing" section 514 to accommodate
state and local schemes.
The central aim of this paper is to illustrate how section 514 might be
amended in the coming years. That analysis requires an understanding of ERISA
preemption and its relationship to pay or play laws. Part I introduces the debate
by describing recent state experimentation with pay or play health insurance
programs. It then turns to a brief overview of ERISA preemption jurisprudence
and proceeds to outline the ways in which pay or play laws are inevitably
ERISA-preempted. Part II embarks on the core analytic contribution of this Note,
articulating and evaluating six different approaches that Congress could use to
5. See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson, Health Law 2005: An Agenda, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 725, 732
(2005) (calling ERISA an "interesting study in the doctrine of unintended consequences").
6. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D. Md. 2006).
7. See Robert Pear, Senator Takes Initiative on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at
A18 (explaining that Obama "still considered health care a top priority, despite the urgent need to
address huge problems afflicting the economy").
8. See David Espo, AP Sources: Senate Group Omits Employer Mandate, ABC NEWS, July 27,
2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wirestory?id=8180071.
X:1 (2010)
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"fix" ERISA preemption of pay or play laws. The Note concludes with a brief
comparison of the approaches offered.
I. ERISA PREEMPTION OF PAY OR PLAY LAWS
A. An Introduction to Pay or Play Health Care Reform
Health care regulation has long been an area of state dominance in
America's federalist system, and states have taken the lead in broad health care
reform efforts.9 States have developed a number of approaches to expand their
citizens' access to health care-including public-private partnerships to develop
insurance purchasing pools and creative leveraging of public funds in the
Medicaid and State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) programs-
but the most comprehensive approaches focus on "pay or play" health reform,
also called employer mandates.' 0 Under pay or play statutes, employers are given
two options for every qualifying employee: either they can "pay" a state tax that
subsidizes health care for the uninsured or they can "play" by providing that
individual with health insurance coverage." President Clinton's proposed Health
Security Act was a variation on the pay or play scheme, and employer mandates
were a centerpiece of the Congressional reform proposals of 2009.12
As governments seek to expand health insurance coverage, employer
mandates offer two primary advantages. First, they promise to build on the
United States' existing employer-based health system. With more than eighty
percent of Americans insisting they are satisfied with their existing health
insurance, health reformers must find a way to introduce change without
9. See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Clearing the Way for an Effective Federal-State Partnership
in Health Reform, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 899 (1999); Arthur Birmingham LaFrance,
Healthcare Reform in the United States: The Role of the States, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 199,
199 (2007).
10. See AMANDA BRODT ET AL., STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVES, STATE OF THE STATES:
BUILDING HOPE, RAISING EXPECTATIONS 20-27 (2007), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/
publications/other/StateoftheStates2007.pdf (discussing various reform initiatives).
11. See PATRICIA A. BUTLER, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, REVISITING PAY OR
PLAY: How STATES COULD EXPAND EMPLOYER-BASED COVERAGE WITHIN ERISA CONSTRAINTS 4
(2002), available at http://www.nashp.org/sites/default/files/ERISAPay-OrPlay.pdf (defining
"pay or play").
12. See, e.g., H.R. 3962, 11 1th Cong. §§ 411-15 (2009) (describing the employer mandate in
one 2009 proposal); Kevin Fickenscher & David Kindig, Elements of the American Health Security
Act of 1993, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 4 (describing the pay or play aspects of the
Health Security Act).
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fundamentally rocking the boat for a "satisfied majority. 1 3 Pay or play, of
course, entrenches employer provided insurance, helping to ensure that things
remain largely unchanged for the employer-insured population. Second, pay or
play offers governments a way to expand coverage by spreading the financial
burden across the private sector. By asking employers to shoulder a significant
percentage of the costs of health reform, employer mandates can control the
public price tag for expanded coverage. Critics of pay or play programs, on the
other hand, emphasize the burden that mandates place on small businesses I4 the
long-term impact on employment prospects, and the failure of mandates to tackle
unsustainable growth in health insurance premiums.'
5
Pay or play programs vary along several dimensions. The two most
important variations are: 1) the type of employer actions that qualify as
"playing," and 2) the amount of the required payment should an employer choose
to "pay." Recently enacted employer mandates in Massachusetts and San
Francisco illustrate this variation.' 6 In particular, Massachusetts sets a very high
bar for qualifying health coverage, requiring "a group health plan ... to which
the employer makes a fair and reasonable premium contribution."' 7 The "play"
option is thus limited to employers who offer subsidized insurance plans that
meet substantive standards. Employers who fail to meet this requirement,
however, are charged a very small fee: no more than $295 per employee per year,
ten percent of the average cost of qualifying coverage.' 8 San Francisco, by
contrast, defines "playing" in very broad terms--employers must spend $1.76 per
employee-hour on health related costs, including everything from providing
13. See Rob Stein & Alexi Mostrous, Debate Focuses on Satisfied Majority, WASH. POST, July
28, 2009, at A4.
14. See, e.g., Robert J. Landry, III & Amy K. Yarbrough, Global Lessons from Consumer
Bankruptcy and Healthcare Reforms in the United States: A Struggling Social Safety Net, 16 MICH.
ST. J. INT'L L. 343, 363 (2007); Lin Lin, Note, All Is Well in Massachusetts? Diagnosing the Effects
of the 2006 Employer Mandate on Health Care Reform Efforts, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
406, 410 (2009).
15. See, e.g., Landry & Yarbrough, supra note 14, at 363.
16. See generally An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care,
2006 Mass. Acts 77; S.F., CAL., HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE § 14.1-14.8 (2007).
17. § 47, 2006 Mass. Acts at 115 (limiting employer contribution to the use of traditional
group health plans, not other tools like health savings accounts, direct reimbursement of employee
medical expenses, etc.).
18. § 44, 2006 Mass. Acts at 11; see also KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND
EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2009 ANNUAL SURVEY 14 (2009), available at
http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2009/7936.pdf (showing that average cost of employer-provided insurance
for an individual is $4824); Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and
Potential Lessonsfrom Massachusetts, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1203, 1214 (2007) (noting the weakness
of a $295 cap).
x:I (2010)
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traditional insurance to reimbursing employees directly for doctor's visits.1 9
Employers who fall short must make up the difference up to the full $1.76 per
employee-hour (or $3660 per year for a full-time employee) into a city fund
dedicated to the provision of health care. 0
Other state laws illustrate even greater diversity. Maryland's statute
considered only employers' total spending on health expenditures, without regard
21to the expenditure on particular employees. Other states have counted
employers' charitable contributions to community clinics or investments in on-
site employee health facilities towards their health care expenditures.22 And the
payment requirements are no more uniform. Some are assessed as a tax23 and
others as a fine. 4 Massachusetts actually assesses a variable payment based on
each employer's "share" of the state's uncompensated care fund, and that share is
calculated based on actual utilization of free care by individuals that work for
each employer.2 5 Thus, pay or play should be conceptualized as a general
framework for involving employers in health care funding, which affords
governments wide latitude to define program requirements.
To date, seven different state and local laws embodying pay or play
requirements have been enacted. Hawaii enacted the country's first employer
mandate in 1974, which requires employers to pay one half of their employees'
health insurance costs. 26 In 2006, Maryland made headlines with its so-called
"Walmart law," officially known as the Fair Share Act, which required private
employers with 10,000 or more employees to spend eight percent of their total
payroll on health insurance.27 Though the statutory language targeted all large
employers, in practice, Walmart was the only covered employer who was not
making an adequate contribution to employee health care. Later that year, two
New York local governments-Suffolk County and New York City-adopted
local pay or play ordinances, requiring large retail stores to make health care
19. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE § 14. 1.
20. Id.
21. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-104 (LexisNexis 2006).
22. See, e.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416-17
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
23. See HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 393-2, 393-31 (LexisNexis 2004) (vesting the Director of
Internal Revenue with enforcement authority).
24. See N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 22-506 (2009), available at
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us (follow "Laws of New York" hyperlink, then follow "ADC"
hyperlink, then navigate to Title 22, Section 506).
25. See An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care § 47(c)(1),
2006 Mass. Acts 77, 116. The statute also caps the required contribution at $295 per employee. §
47(c)(10), 2006 Mass. Acts at 117.
26. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 760 (9th Cir. 1980).
27. MD. CODE. ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-104(b) (LexisNexis 2006).
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contributions. The Massachusetts and San Francisco programs described above
are the highest profile recent excursions into pay or play laws. Vermont has also
implemented a plan that is similar to the Massachusetts program.28 The Michigan
Democratic Party recently announced that they were considering an employer
mandate-based ballot initiative for the fall of 2010,29 and advocates continue to
prod large states to explore pay or play reforms.
30
Indeed, it is clear that pay or play health care reform offers state and local
governments a flexible tool for shrinking the ranks of the uninsured and
improving access to health care for their citizens. Moreover, employer mandates
are now a staple of all comprehensive reform discussions.31 However, as we shall
see in the next section, these laws are extremely vulnerable to challenges of
federal preemption under ERISA. We turn to a brief overview of the contours
ERISA jurisprudence in Section I.B, before applying these concepts to pay or
play laws in Section I.C.
B. ERISA Preemption in the Courts
In the main, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
provides a comprehensive federal scheme regulating benefits that employers
provide to their employees. The statute's regulatory scheme governs two broad
categories of employee benefits: "pension plans," which provide income to
employees after their retirement, and "employee welfare benefit plans," which
offer short-term benefits like health or life insurance to employees.32 The law was
intended to balance the needs of labor and management, offering employees a
regulatory regime that would ensure access to promised benefits, while ensuring
that employers would be bound by a set of uniform national laws rather than a
patchwork of state pension regulations. This tradeoff required Congress to enact
an explicit preemption clause, barring state law from regulating pensions and
benefits.33
28. STATE OF VT. AGENCY OF ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF VERMONT'S HEALTH CARE REFORM 1
(2008), available at http://hcr.vermont.gov/sites/hcr/files/RevisedVermontHCROverview_
October_08-0.pdf.
29. See Dawson Bell, Democrats Test Water for Ballot Proposals, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July
23, 2009, at A8, available at 2009 WLNR 15669318.
30. See BRODT ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
3 1. See, e.g., id. at 34.
32. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 89-90 (4th ed. 2006).
33. Federal preemption of state law can be either express (federal legislation explicitly states
that state law is preempted) or implied (legislation is silent but state and federal law cannot
logically coexist). Implied preemption is further divided into two categories, conflict and field
preemption. Conflict preemption refers to those cases where it is simply impossible to comply with
X:I (2010)
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It is that preemption clause that threatens to swallow up states' health care
reform efforts. In now-infamous language, ERISA subsection 514(a) announces
the scope of federal preemption of state law in broad terms: ERISA regulation
"shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan described [in the Act]. 34 Interpretation of section
514 has turned on the contours of the phrase "relate to," and nearly thirty years of
jurisprudence illustrate the difficulty of defining the scope of that term.
The overbroad language of subsection 514(a) is complicated by a series of
exceptions (and exceptions to the exceptions) that have important implications
for health insurance benefits. First, subsection 514(b), known as the "savings
clause," importantly narrows the law's preemptive scope by saving from
preemption "any State [law] which regulates insurance, banking, or securities. 35
Recognizing the potentially broad reach of the preemption language, Congress
carved out a few distinct spheres where state regulation would be permitted-
insurance, banking, and securities. But in the next subparagraph, known as the
"deemer clause," Congress immediately and sharply limited the extent of the
insurance/banking/securities exception. That language declares that no
"employee benefit plan ... shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company" that is subject to a state's
insurance, banking, and security regulations.36 Put more concretely, the deemer
clause says that if an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan does things that
make it "look like" an insurance company or a bank, it is nonetheless exempt
from state regulation in this area. The most relevant example is large employers
who "self-insure" their employees. The self-insurance fund is covered by the
statute as an ERISA plan. Thus, although these ERISA plans perform exactly the
same functions as a health insurance company (paying for some but not all
employee/enrollee medical expenses), the deemer clause exempts them from
state regulations that apply to the rest of the insurance market.37
state and federal requirements simultaneously (e.g., state law requires pension information to be
presented by union representatives, but federal law requires the information be provided only by
the employer). Field preemption refers to situations where it is technically possible to comply with
both state and federal law, but courts determine that the federal government intended to occupy the
entire "field" and displace state law (e.g., state law requires pensions to vest after a term of ten
years or less, federal law requires pensions to vest after a term of fifteen years or less-while it is
possible to satisfy the state law without violating the federal law, field preemption principles might
dictate that the federal law ought to override the state). These concepts often overlap; for example,
an express preemption clause that speaks to some but not all issues can be used to guide courts in
understanding the proper scope of field preemption.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
35. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
36. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
37. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, 51 UCLA L.
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To further complicate the statutory scheme, section 514 contains a number
of other exceptions and clarifications, most of which are not relevant here. 38 In
1982, Congress added an important exemption applicable only to the State of
Hawaii: After the Supreme Court held that Hawaii's pay or play health care
reform program was ERISA preempted,39 Congress specifically exempted the
Hawaiian law from preemption. 40 The exemption is narrow, however, and only
covers the Hawaii law as it existed in 1974, when ERISA was first enacted.41
Finally, ERISA's broad preemption language is, quite logically, not
applicable to plans that are not regulated by ERISA. Section 403(b)(3) of the Act
explicitly excludes from regulation any plan "maintained solely for the purpose
of complying with applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment
compensation or disability insurance laws. 4 2 In this provision, Congress
recognized that, while some employers voluntarily provided generous benefits
associated with workplace injuries or layoffs, state governments were actively
involved in ensuring a minimum level of protection through workers'
compensation or unemployment benefit schemes. Thus, ERISA regulation does
not apply to plans maintained "solely" to comply with these state law
requirements, and the relevant state laws are not ERISA preempted. This
"compliance plan" exception is decidedly under-theorized, but is nonetheless a
part of the ERISA preemption landscape.43
With this background in the statutory framework, I turn to ERISA
preemption as it has been shaped by the Supreme Court. The discussion briefly
illustrates the Court's initial approach, then offers a description of recent
jurisprudence.
REv. 457, 486-88 (2003) (discussing the problem of "self-insured employers").
38. "[G]enerally applicable criminal law[s]" are not preempted by the broad language of
514(a), nor are "qualified domestic relations orders" or state tort actions dealing with the
recoupment of some funds under Medicaid programs. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4), (b)(7), (b)(8) (2006).
39. See Agsalud v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 454 U.S. 801 (1981), summarily aff'g Standard
Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980).
40. See Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301, 96 Stat. 2605, 2611 (1983) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(5) (2006)).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(ii) (2006).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (2006).
43. A Westlaw search for works in the legal academy discussing the section of the code
revealed several dozen articles discussing the existence of the compliance plan exception, mostly in
the context of entities that are exempt from malpractice litigation, but only one article exploring
this section of the preemption clause as a potential policy tool. See James E. Holloway, Revisiting
Cooperative Federalism in Mandated Employer-Sponsored Health Care Programs Under the
ERISA Preemption Provision, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 239, 268-69 n.207 (briefly discussing the
compliance exemption and listing the handful of relevant cases).
X:l (2010)
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1. Early Preemption Doctrine
ERISA preemption analysis begins with the statute's broad displacement of
state laws that "relate to" ERISA-regulated benefits. Indeed, the first fifteen years
of the Supreme Court's ERISA preemption jurisprudence were characterized by a
rather literal interpretation of the phrase "relate to" that rendered preemption of
state law "nearly automatic.",44 In 1981, the Court decided its first case, Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., which involved a New Jersey law that prevented
employers from reducing pension plan benefits because of a workers'
compensation award.45 A unanimous Court easily concluded that the law was
preempted.46 But, foreshadowing decades of unpredictable and often bizarre
jurisprudence, the Court acknowledged that the "relate to" language engendered
"some confusion" when the state law at issue affects ERISA plans only
indirectly.47
In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Court held that ERISA preempted a
state law requiring that employee benefit plans cover pregnancy disability.48 The
Court expounded on the scope of preemption when state law had an indirect
effect on ERISA-regulated subjects, saying, "A law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan ... if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan., 49 It is not
abundantly clear that "connection with" provides substantially more guidance to
lower courts than 514(a)'s "relate to" language, but the "connection with or
reference to" test quickly became black letter law.5° Importantly, the Shaw Court
acknowledged that a law "may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant" preemption,51 carving out a possible
exception to their otherwise broad holding.
Nonetheless, in subsequent cases the Court relied on the "connection with or
reference to" standard to conclude that numerous state laws were preempted by
the federal scheme. State laws mandating coverage of mental health benefits,
52
providing a cause of action for bad faith claim denials, 53 regulating benefit plan
44. Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the New Jurisprudence of
ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 808 (1999).
45.451 U.S. 504 (1981).
46. Id. at 505.
47. Id. at 523.
48. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
49. Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added).
50. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 770.
51. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
52. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985). The Court held that the law at
issue "relate[d] to" ERISA plans, but was nonetheless saved by the insurance exemption. Id. at 746.
53. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
11
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treatment of tort suit awards,54 and governing benefit provision to workers'
compensation beneficiaries 55 were held preempted. A handful of state laws were
saved from ERISA preemption, including a generally applicable state
garnishment statute56 and a state law requiring one-time severance payments to
laid-off workers.57
The Court's opinion in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon58 is emblematic of
its post-Shaw jurisprudence. The plaintiff in that case claimed that his employer
discharged him only to prevent his pension plan from vesting, which would
constitute wrongful termination under state law. The Court held that the state
common law claim was preempted by ERISA. 59 The holding reaffirmed the idea
that a state law that only indirectly affected an ERISA-plan could nonetheless be
preempted. 60 Additionally, the Court emphasized that the state law claim
depended on the existence of a plan in order to determine liability.61 The state law
was not the kind of "generally applicable statute that ... functions irrespective of
... an ERISA plan,' 62 because the law only made sense in a world of employee
benefit plans. Therefore, even though the state law did not place burdens on plans
qua plans, and instead imposed burdens on employers who had plans, it was still
the kind of state requirement that manifested an inappropriate "connection with
or reference to" ERISA.
In sum, under the Court's initial approach, section 514 broadly preempted
state law. One scholar has characterized the tortured scope of ERISA preemption,
noting that state law was preempted "even if such laws [were] 'not specifically
designed to affect' ERISA plans, [and] even if the effect . . . '[was] only
indirect."' 63 As the cases described above illustrate, ERISA section 514 presented
"one of the broadest preemption clauses ever enacted by Congress. 64
54. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
55. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
56. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988). In a rather
ironic holding, the Court applied the "reference to" test to preempt a small portion of the state
statute. Georgia, in language clearly designed to avoid ERISA preemption, announced that the law
did not apply to a "plan or program subject to ERISA," but the Court concluded this clause was
preempted as an impermissible reference. Id. at 829-30.
57. Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987). The Court held that this one
time payment was not a "plan" within the meaning of ERISA.
58. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
59. Id. at 137.
60. Id. at 139.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Zelinsky, supra note 44, at 829 (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of
Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992)).
64. 953 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Evans v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 1437,
X:I (2010)
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2. Travelers and Recent Jurisprudence
65 6Throughout the early- and mid-1990s, commentators, lower courts, 66 and
even Supreme Court Justices 67 began to express frustration with the state of
ERISA preemption jurisprudence. By 1995, the Court was prepared to revisit its
approach to section 514.
In New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co., the Court fundamentally altered its interpretation of section 514.68
Justice Souter's unanimous opinion admitted some frustration with "uncritical
literalism" in applying the "connection with or reference to" test, but did not
technically overrule or even limit Shaw, Ingersoll-Rand, or any of the Court's
prior section 514 decisions.69 Nonetheless, Travelers is widely understood to
have created a "sea change" in ERISA preemption doctrine.
70
At issue in the case was a New York state law that levied surcharges against
all payers of hospital bills, except Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans.7 1 The law
undoubtedly had an indirect effect on employee benefit plans, since their
employees' medical costs were subject to the surcharge if the employer's ERISA
plan self-insured or used conventional commercial insurance, but not if the plan
elected Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage. Yet the Court upheld the New York
law.72 While the surcharge had "an indirect economic effect" on ERISA plans, it
did not actually "bind plan administrators" to a particular design choice.73 Nor
did it "preclude uniform administrative practice, 74 since the administrative
burden fell to the hospitals, not the plan. Thus, there was no impermissible
connection with an ERISA plan in the law.
1439 (9th Cir. 1990)).
65. See, e.g., Gabrielle Lessard, Conflicting Demands Meet Conflict of Laws: ERISA
Preemption of Wisconsin's Family and Medical Leave Act, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 809, 822-23.
66. See, e.g., Gast v. State, 585 P.2d 12, 23 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
67. In a 1992 dissent, Justice Stevens encouraged the Court "to take a fresh look" at ERISA
preemption. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 135 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
69. Id. at 656.
70. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat'l Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir.
1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Robert F. Rich, Christopher T. Erb & Louis J.
Gale, Judicial Interpretation of Managed Care Policy, 13 ELDER L.J. 85, 92 (2005) ("[I]n the
seminal case of Travelers the Court initiated what many today perceive to be a sea change in
ERISA preemption policy and interpretation.").
71. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 649-50.
72. Id. at 650.
73. Id. at 659.
74. Id. at 660.
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Subsequent cases generally followed this approach, and in particular picked
up on the Travelers emphasis on state laws that "bind plan administrators" to
particular choices. In California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc., the Court considered a state law affecting
apprenticeship programs, which are ERISA plans.75  California allowed
contractors to pay lower wages to apprentices in state-approved programs,
thereby creating an incentive for apprenticeship programs to seek state approval.
The Dillingham Court insisted that the state law was no more than an incentive
and was not preempted by ERISA; it did not "bind ERISA plans to anything,"
nor was it "tantamount to a compulsion., 76 In much-quoted language, the Court
concluded that the law was permissible because it "alters the incentives, but does
not dictate the choices" of ERISA plans.77
The Court's next ERISA case dealt with a state law that acted directly (as
opposed to indirectly) on an ERISA plan. In De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical &
Clinical Services Fund, the Court upheld a New York law that imposed a general
tax on health care facilities.78 The law was challenged by an ERISA plan that
administered its own health care facility subject to the tax. 79 Acknowledging that
this law certainly had "some [direct] effect on the administration of ERISA
plans," the Court nonetheless concluded that it was not preempted by 514(a).8°
The Court described the statute as "one of myriad state laws of general
applicability that impose some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but
nevertheless do not relate to them."81 In the context of the relevant state statute
and the accumulated ERISA jurisprudence, there may be some logic to this
formulation. But it makes clear the linguistic absurdity in the post-Travelers
cases: it is truly remarkable to conclude that a "burden" is "unrelated" to the
object that shoulders it.82
The descriptions above highlight only a few of the Court's recent section
514 cases, and they neglect a great deal of nuance in the cases presented. But
they do illustrate several themes that are important for understanding preemption
of state "pay or play" laws. First, consider the Court's emphasis on "alter[ing] the
incentives" versus "dictat[ing] the choices facing ERISA plans," which was most
75. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
76. Id. at 332, 333.
77. Id. at 334.
78. 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
79. Id. at 809.
80. Id. at 816.
81. Id. at 815 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
82. Cf Zelinsky, supra note 44, at 808 (deploring ERISA preemption jurisprudence that shows
no "regard for the terms of the statute").
X:1 (2010)
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clearly articulated in Dillingham but has its conceptual origin in Travelers.83
Indeed, this formulation of the "test" for ERISA preemption has received a great
deal of attention in the legal literature, 84 including the literature on preemption of
pay or play schemes. 85 Under this approach, state laws are evaluated based on the
extent to which they coerce, rather than merely incentivize, ERISA plans in order
to promote desired outcomes.
But a second theme, less prominently articulated but similarly originating in
Travelers, also underlies these cases: the locus and nature of the administrative
burden associated with the state law is important. Thus, in Travelers the Court
emphasized that New York's hospital surcharge law did not interfere with
"uniform administrative practice" for ERISA plans.86 The law's administrative
burden instead fell to hospitals, not to an ERISA-covered entity. Justice Thomas
has built on this theme, emphasizing that one impermissible law required ERISA
plans to be changed to comply with the state's requirement.87 Clearly, that action
might impair national uniformity.88 In this view, state laws are evaluated based
on the extent to which they actually "touch" ERISA plans, regardless of whether
those touches are "coercive." Indeed, this sort of analysis begins to look more
like implied preemption jurisprudence, essentially ignoring the preemption clause
and instead focusing on the actual effect that fifty unique state regimes might
have on a federally-regulated entity.89
83. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S.
316, 334 (1997); N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 659 (1995) ("An indirect economic influence, however, does not bind plan administrators
to any particular choice .... ).
84. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Brauch, Municipal Activism v. Federal Law: Why ERISA Preempts
San Francisco-Style Domestic Partner Ordinances, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 925, 947, 962 (1998);
Larry J. Pittman, ERISA 's Preemption Clause: Progress Towards a More Equitable Preemption of
State Laws, 34 IND. L. REV. 207, 214-20 (2001); Alice T. Armstrong, Comment, ERISA Preemption
of "Any Willing Provider": The Eighth Circuit Got It Right, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 753, 769-73
(1999); Meridith H. Bogart, Note, State Doctrines of Substantial Compliance: A Call for ERISA
Preemption and Uniform Federal Common Law Doctrine, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 447, 465-66
(2003).
85. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 18, at 1209-10; Edward A. Zelinsky, The New
Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and Experimentation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229, 251-
52 (2007).
86. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 660.
87. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2001).
88. Id. at 152.
89. Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg, in a pair of concurring opinions, have called upon the
Court to do exactly this-abandon much of the section 514(a) jurisprudence, and hold that the
statute's preemptive scope is precisely congruent with traditional field and conflict preemption. Id.
at 152 (Scalia, J., concurring); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
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Finally, these cases underscore that the "connection with or reference to"
framework survived the Travelers revolution. Travelers, Dillingham, and
DeBuono all open by affirming this approach. 90 Thus, while Shaw's "nearly
automatic" approach to preemption is no longer good law, section 514 cases still
develop quite deliberately by looking for "connections" and "references."
Moreover, much of the pre-Travelers thinking is still reflected and cited.91 For
this reason, cases like Ingersoll-Rand are relevant to the preemption landscape,
even if their precise interpretative approaches no longer reflect the Court's
thinking.
92
To summarize, ERISA preemption jurisprudence began with a decade in
which state laws that had only the most indirect and tangential effects on ERISA-
regulated subject matter were nonetheless held preempted. The Court changed
course in 1995 with Travelers, and began to chaotically and somewhat
unpredictably scale back on the scope of federal preemption. In subsequent cases,
the Court appeared to focus on two kinds of issues-the extent to which state law
compelled (rather than merely encouraged) ERISA plans to operate in particular
ways, and the magnitude and locus of the administrative burdens. Indeed, in the
last fifteen years, ERISA preemption has changed drastically, though the Court
has yet to formally renounce its earlier decisions.
C. ERISA Preemption of Pay or Play Programs
These broad outlines frame potential ERISA preemption of state pay or play
laws. And there is reason to be pessimistic: some observers have flatly concluded
that it is "hard to envision significant state experimentation with medical
coverage that does not run afoul" of ERISA's preemption clause, 93 and that all
employer mandates "are preempted by ERISA. ' ,94 Indeed, as explained below,
despite the Court's somewhat relaxed post-Travelers approach, it is fairly clear
that state attempts to mandate employer health insurance programs generally
constitute impermissible and ERISA-preempted govemance of employee benefit
plans.
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a discussion of field and conflict
preemption, see supra note 33.
90. See Egelhoff 532 U.S. at 149; Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 323; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 623.
91. See generally Robert N. Covington, Amending ERISA's Preemption Scheme, 8 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 1, 9 (1999) ("Is there really a new order under ERISA? Answer: 'Yes, BUT .... "').
92. See, e.g., Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149-50 (citing Ingersoll-Rand for the proposition that fifty
dissimilar state laws would pose too steep an administrative burden on ERISA plans).
93. See Zelinsky, supra note 85, at 286.
94. Michael H. Bernstein & John T. Seybert, You Can't Get There from Here: Erisa
Preemption of State Laws Mandating Employer Healthcare Contributions, 3 ABA HEALTH
ESOURCE, Mar, 2007, http://www.abanet.org/health/esource/Volume3/07/bemstein-seybert.html.
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Courts have addressed ERISA preemption of four of the seven state and
local statutes described above. Laws in Suffolk County and Maryland have been
held ERISA preempted,95 and the Supreme Court's holding that Hawaii's law
was preempted led to a special congressional exception.96 In the only ERISA
opinion that has been favorable to a pay or play law, the Ninth Circuit held that
San Francisco's program survived ERISA preemption; the case has been
appealed to the Supreme Court. 97 New York City's law has not been challenged
and remains on the books, but has not been enforced due to conflict between the
mayor and city council regarding the permissibility of the statute under ERISA.9 8
Meanwhile, the Massachusetts and Vermont laws have not been subject to
judicial review and are currently being implemented.
As explained above, the Court's ERISA preemption jurisprudence has been
anything but coherent. Therefore, it is useful to trace a number of themes that
appear in the pay or play cases: exploring the dictated choices versus altered
incentives framework, locating administrative burdens, and relying on the
existence of an ERISA plan. These themes repeatedly appear in the reported
opinions that have considered ERISA preemption of pay or play laws, and the
laws that have escaped preemption challenges are vulnerable along the same
dimensions.
1. Controlling the Level of Benefits: Choices and Incentives
The Court's first foray into ERISA preemption emphasized the importance
of ensuring that "private parties, not the Government, control the level of
benefits" provided under an ERISA plan.99 Post-Travelers, the federal courts
have attempted to define exactly what it means for a state statute to "control the
level of benefits," and they have largely settled on the test articulated in
Dillingham, distinguishing between laws that "alter[] the incentives" and laws
95. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007), affg 435 F. Supp.
2d 481 (D. Md. 2006); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(ii) (2000) (creating an exception to ERISA preemption for
Hawaii); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 393-2 (LexisNexis 2004) (Hawaii's pay or play law); Standard
Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), affd. mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981) (holding the
statute ERISA preempted).
97. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008).
98. See N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 22-506 (2009), available at
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us (follow "Laws of New York" hyperlink, then follow "ADC"
hyperlink, then navigate to Title 22, Section 506). The official codification notes that the law's
validity is "currently a subject of disagreement between the mayor and the city council."
99. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 511 (1981) (emphasis added).
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that "dictate the choices" of ERISA plans. 00 Until recently, this framework has
not been charitable to employer mandates.
Perhaps the best example of how this test has been applied to relevant state
laws appears in the Fourth Circuit's discussion of the Maryland "Walmart"
statute. In that case, Maryland insisted that the law did not "mandate" that
employers provide benefits under an ERISA plan, because employers had a
choice between spending at least eight percent of their payroll on health benefits,
or spending less than eight percent and paying any difference as an assessment to
the state. 0 1 In this view, the law was merely a Dillingham-like incentive,
encouraging but not requiring employers to take certain actions with respect to
ERISA-governed plans. The courts unequivocally rejected this view. The district
court described the statute as providing a "Hobson's choice," since there was not
"a single reason why the employer would pay the state."'' 0 2 The Fourth Circuit
continued, "The only rational choice employers have ...is to structure their
ERISA healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum spending
threshold."10 3
Courts have also relied on legislative intent in crafting pay or play statutes,
focusing on legislative sponsors' statements regarding the consequence of the
law. A court reviewing the Suffolk County statute emphasized legislators' hope
that the statute would force "Wal-Mart and the big box stores" to offer health
benefits. 0 4 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit insisted that supporters "understood the
[Maryland Fair Share] Act as requiring Walmart to increase its healthcare
spending."'0 5 Thus, even though these pay or play statutes technically offer
employers a "choice," courts have based their ERISA inquiry on the general
goals underlying the pay or play statutes. Indeed, one observer has advised
legislators seeking to avoid ERISA preemption to explicitly "remain neutral
regarding whether employers offer health coverage or pay the tax" in order to
prevent preemption. 106 Thus, attempts to achieve coverage expansions through
employer mandates are often ERISA-preempted because they do not offer
employers a meaningful choice between "paying" and "playing."
100. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S.
316, 334 (1997).
101. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder (Fielder 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 497 (D. Md.
2006).
102. Id.
103. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder (Fielder I1), 475 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
104. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 407-08
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
105. Fielder 11, 475 F.3d at 194.
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It is particularly instructive to consider this issue in the context of the
Massachusetts and Vermont reform legislation, which have yet to be challenged
on ERISA grounds. Recall that both laws require employers to make a
"reasonable" contribution to precisely defined employee health care benefits, or
pay a relatively small "assessment" or "fee" to the state-less than $400 per
employee per year.10 7 Recent estimates suggest that it costs nearly $4500 to
provide annual health insurance for a single employee;108 therefore, it may be
easier for a court to conclude that these statutes actually do offer a choice to
employers and ERISA plans. Indeed, Professor Monahan recently concluded that
Massachusetts' requirements "survive preemption [because] there is a relatively
modest financial disincentive" associated with paying rather playing.10 9 While
this approach may seem plausible, in fact, Professor Zelinsky and others have
persuasively argued that the modest assessment does not immunize these laws
from ERISA preemption.1 10 For these statutes do not simply require states to
spend a certain amount on health care or pay a much smaller fee to the state.
Instead, they require employers to provide health benefits that meet certain
substantive standards, like including primary care benefits, if they wish to avoid
paying the fee. In this way, then, pay or play laws "regulat[e] the substance of
[ERISA] plans" in an impermissible way.11 Indeed, the laws "dictate the
choices" by "expressly regulat[ing] employers and the type of benefits they
provide employees."' 1 2 In other words, the Massachusetts and Vermont statutes
may offer employers a choice between paying and playing. But for employers
who do choose to offer health benefits, the laws impermissibly "dictate" the way
in which the benefit must be provided.
Thus, pay or play statutes will often "dictate the choices" and therefore
manifest an impermissible "connection" with ERISA plans. They go too far
towards shaping the way employers provide benefits to employees-either by
creating too stiff a penalty for failing to offer health benefits, or by impermissibly
regulating how employers structure their benefits.
2. Administrative Burden
Another aspect of the "connection with" test that has survived-and even
107. See An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care § 47,
2006 Mass. Acts 77, 115; STATE OF VT. AGENCY OF ADMIN., supra note 28, at 38.
108. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2007 ANNUAL SURVEY 1-2
(2007), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/index.cfm.
109. Monahan, supra note 18, at 1216.
110. See, e.g., Bernstein & Seybert, supra note 94; Zelinsky, supra note 85, at 234.
111. Zelinsky, supra note 85, at 257.
112. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 766 (9th Cir. 1980).
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flourished-in the aftermath of Travelers is an inquiry into the administrative
burdens associated with the state law." 3 Of course, by forcing employers to
comply with substantive or minimum spending requirements in the provision of
health benefits, pay or play statutes create substantial administrative burdens.
114
The laws force employers and ERISA plans to alter their benefit structures in
order to either spend a certain amount on health care expenditures or comply
with substantive regulations, and these alterations impede the "uniform
administrative scheme" that ERISA allegedly envisions." 15 Administrative
complexity underlay the Court's concern about Hawaii's employer mandate-in
a subsequent ERISA case the Court observed that "if Hawaii could demand the
operation of a particular benefit plan, so could other States, which would require
that the employer coordinate perhaps dozens of programs." '" 6 Indeed, courts have
gone beyond the structural burdens imposed by pay or play laws and concluded
that even the recordkeeping requirements associated with these laws constitute an
impermissible administrative burden.' '
The administrative complexity question has taken on particular significance
in the context of employer mandates enacted by cities and counties, including the
Suffolk County and San Francisco statutes. The New York district court
emphasized that the Suffolk County law "would require that Wal-Mart make a
different expenditure for employees in Suffolk County" and would thus "inhibit
the administration of a uniform plan nationwide." '" 8 Similarly, one court was
concerned with employers needing to "keep an eye on the minimum health care
spending requirements in each locality."
' 19
But even in the statewide context, administrative complexity is a major
concern of the courts. The Maryland law applied only to very large employers
and operated statewide, but the courts found that the law impermissibly interfered
with plan administration. 20 The Massachusetts and Vermont laws arguably
113. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001) (explaining that administrative uniformity
was one of the statute's "principal goals").
114. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 495 (D. Md. 2006).
115. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148 (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9
(1987)).
116. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 13.
117. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. San Francisco (Golden Gate 1), 535 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976
(N.D. Cal. 2007), rev'd, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he requirements of the Ordinance have
an impermissible connection with employee benefit plans because they impose on employers
specific recordkeeping, inspection and other administrative burdens related to the administration of
their private healthcare expenditures.").
118. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 418 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
119. Golden Gate I, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 970, rev'd, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008).
120. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
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impose even greater administrative burdens because they regulate substantive
aspects of the benefit plan, not just total expenditures. Because they seek
substantive changes in employer-provided health care benefits, pay or play laws
go to the core of ERISA preemption analysis by creating unacceptable
administrative burdens that interfere with "nationally uniform plan
administration."
12 1
3. The Existence of an ERISA Plan
In Ingersoll-Rand, the Court called attention to state laws that are premised
on the "existence" of an ERISA plan, 122 concluding that a statute that would not
function in the absence of ERISA-govemed benefits was, in effect, an
impermissible "reference to" a covered plan. The Dillingham Court reiterated
this theme, condemning statutes "where the existence of ERISA plans is essential
to the law's operation."' 2 3 Despite tortured state attempts to avoid assuming the
existence of ERISA plans, pay or play programs run afoul of this requirement.
Employer mandates, by definition, require the state or municipality to
determine if an employer has made a statutorily adequate contribution to
employee health care. Certainly, a state law which defined its requirements
specifically in terms of ERISA's "employee welfare benefit plans" would be
preempted because it specifically "references" and assumes the "existence" of
ERISA entities. However, as states have taken more creative approaches to
defining what constitutes "playing," courts have taken a more functional
approach to preemption. For example, some state laws that require employers to
spend a fixed amount on "employee health care" also include a long definition of
qualified health care expenses, which include ERISA and non-ERISA
expenditures. Maryland included Health Savings Accounts and on-site employee
health clinics,1 24 while Suffolk County also included employers' charitable
contributions to local community health centers. 125 The Fourth Circuit essentially
ignored the Health Savings Account and on-site clinic components of the statute,
observing that they "simply would not be a serious means" by which employers
would choose to comply with the law. 126 In reviewing the Suffolk County statute,
the district court similarly found that it was "unreasonable" to expect employers
121. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141,142 (2001).
122. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990).
123. Cal. Div. Labor Standards & Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S.
316, 325 (1996).
124. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to -107 (LexisNexis 2006); 2005 Md.
Laws 3 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (LexisNexis 2007)).
125. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (describing the Suffolk County law).
126. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2007).
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to contribute to a community health center in place of an employee health plan,
thus the statute relied on the existence of, and therefore impermissibly
referenced, ERISA plans. The California district court nicely summarized this
approach, focusing on the "undeniable fact . . . that the vast majority of any
employer's healthcare spending occurs through ERISA plans."'127 In this view,
any state law that attempts to assess health expenditures necessarily references
ERISA plans. Given courts' functional approach to the "reference to" portion of
the preemption inquiry, most pay or play statutes impermissibly depend on
ERISA spending in order to determine employer liability.
4. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion in Golden Gate Restaurant Ass'n
As described above, most courts addressing the issue have held that pay or
play statutes are barred by ERISA. The only exception is a 2008 decision in the
Ninth Circuit, concluding that San Francisco's employer mandate was not
preempted. 128 In that opinion, Circuit Judge Fletcher overturned a lower court
decision holding the statute preempted by ERISA. He also offered a detailed
analysis of the program, which required employers to spend $1.76 per hour per
employee, or $3500 per year for full time employees.
The court first addressed the argument that San Francisco's law had an
impermissible "connection with" employers' ERISA-covered plans. 129 Quoting
extensively from Travelers and emphasizing that the law did not "bind plan
administrators to any particular choice," the court rejected this assertion. 130 The
court did not focus on the ways in which the statute might influence employers'
decisions about whether or not to adopt ERISA-covered health plans, which had
been at the heart of the Fourth Circuit's analysis of this issue.'13 Instead, the
Ninth Circuit highlighted the fact that the San Francisco ordinance had only a
minimal impact on employers' decisions about what to do inside their health
insurance plans. San Francisco did not require or encourage particular forms of
coverage, and in that respect "the influence exerted by the [San Francisco]
127. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. San Francisco (Golden Gate 1), 535 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976
(N.D. Cal. 2007), rev'd, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008).
128. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. San Francisco (Golden Gate Ill), 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir.
2008). This decision followed an earlier 2008 opinion in which Judge Fletcher stayed the district
court's decision overturning the ordinance. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. San Francisco (Golden Gate
II), 513 F.3d 1112 (2008).
129. Golden Gate III, 546 F.3d at 654.
130. Id. at 656.
131. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). The Ninth
Circuit distinguished the Fourth Circuit case by emphasizing the fact that under the San Francisco
law, benefits actually could accrue to employers who chose to pay, rather than play, which was not
the case under Maryland's Walmart law. Golden Gate III, 546 F.3d at 659-61.
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Ordinance is even less direct than the influence in Travelers."'' 32 More broadly,
because San Francisco only cared about the level of payment, not the type of
benefits, there was no preemption.
The court then rejected the claim that the law's administrative burdens
rendered it ERISA-preempted. Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, Judge
Fletcher insisted that the burdens fell "on the employer rather than on an ERISA
plan" and were thus irrelevant to the preemption inquiry.
133
Finally, the Ninth Circuit considered whether San Francisco's ordinance
made a "reference to" ERISA plans. 134 Using the Ingersoll-Rand test, which
looks to a statute's reliance on the "existence of an ERISA plan," the court
concluded that the law did not assume the existence of ERISA-governed
benefits. 135 Indeed, the opinion eschewed the functional inquiry described above
and instead concluded simply that employers could pay the tax to the city, and
therefore the statute could "have its full force and effect even if no employer in
the City has an ERISA plan." 136 Furthermore, to the extent the San Francisco law
"referenced" anything, it was a permissible "reference to the payments provided
by the employer to an ERISA plan," and not an impermissible "reference to the
level of benefits provided."'1 37
The Ninth Circuit analysis is certain to draw criticism, and some have
argued that it would not withstand Supreme Court scrutiny.138 Yet, even if the
reasoning is durable, the core conclusion is that San Francisco's law is
permissible because it looks at nothing more than the dollar value of employers'
health care expenditures. This reasoning gives state and local governments only
the bluntest tool with which to craft health care reform and does not enable a
broader array of experimentation. As a simple example, states may wish to
expand their safety net health care services for youth, while creating soft
employer incentives to cover their employees' children. 139 Perhaps more to the
132. Golden Gate III, 546 F.3d at 656.
133. Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 658.
135. Id. at 652.
136. Id. at 657.
137. Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
138. See, e.g., Sharon Jacobs, The Ninth Circuit Gives San Francisco's Health Care Security
Ordinance the Green Light (For Now), 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 431, 433 (2008).
139. In the events surrounding the 2007 negotiations over SCHIP, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a "Dear State Health Official" letter to states that had
requested permission to expand their CHIP programs. In the letter denying the states' request, CMS
emphasized that states must not expand CHIP without taking steps to prevent children with existing
employer-provided coverage from being shifted into the public program. In the letter, CMS
suggested states take several steps, including enacting laws that "[p]revent[] employers from
changing dependent coverage policies that would favor a shift to public coverage." See Letter from
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point, Massachusetts's employer mandate explicitly requires a "group health
plan" and would undoubtedly be impermissible under the Ninth Circuit's
approach.
Nor is the problem limited to the pivot points in the Ninth Circuit's analysis.
In the seven statutes described above, legislators have gone to absurd lengths in
their attempts to survive preemption. The Maryland legislature thought it could
escape ERISA preemption by including expenditures on "workplace clinics" as a
qualified health care cost. Yet it is difficult to imagine that encouraging
employers to provide free Band-Aids and cough syrup ought to be a crucial
component of the health reform agenda. Suffolk County chose to include
employer contributions to local community health centers, but, again, mandated
corporate charity hardly seems like a stable solution for the forty-seven million
uninsured. And Massachusetts believed it had to cap the employer payment at
less than ten percent of the cost of health insurance, which will ultimately limit
the effectiveness and may jeopardize the solvency of their project. In other
words, states are engaged in legislative contortions to escape ERISA preemption,
and courts have regularly concluded that even that is not enough.
If state and local pay or play laws are going to be a viable component of
health care reform, governments must be able to avoid these absurdities and
confidently design pay or play programs to meet their legitimate health system
needs. Therefore, it is important to amend ERISA section 514, giving states the
freedom to realistically explore their options, balance incentives, and creatively
design programs. The next Part considers options for amending the statute,
particularly in the context of a national health care initiative.
II. AMENDING ERISA
Despite extensive discussion of the difficulties associated with ERISA
preemption jurisprudence, very little attention has been paid to the contours of a
potential legislative change to section 514. Even within the growing body of
literature addressing preemption of state pay or play laws, little has been said
about how the federal statute might be amended. However, as a window of
reform opportunity opens, it is imperative to have solutions on the table.
Therefore, building on the above explanation of ERISA preemption, this Part
discusses a number of approaches for amending the statute, exploring ways to
restructure statutory preemption and allow state and local health insurance reform
to flourish.
Dennis G. Smith, Director, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to State Health Officials
(Aug. 17, 2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/smdl/downloads/SHO081707.pdf. However,
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This conversation is particularly timely, as serious discussion about national
health care reform resumes for the first time in nearly fifteen years. National
legislation may impose some type of federal mandate requiring employer health
insurance contributions, 140 but it may also create, exacerbate, or simply ignore
problems that states or even localities can tackle through their own programs.
There will undoubtedly be gaps in the categories of employers and employees
included in the federal reform and in the type of care covered. A prolonged
phase-in period or a broad set of exceptions will create a larger space where state
and local governments may wish to take action. States will need to mediate the
relationship between any federal programs or mandates and Medicaid and other
state safety net programs. A truly comprehensive program is simply not on the
horizon, and there remains an important role for states and localities to play.
Furthermore, negotiations surrounding health care reform provide an ideal
legislative vehicle. 14 1 The nascent health care reform conversations already
involve state and local governments, employers, unions, and insurance
companies-all key actors in the ERISA landscape. 42 This moment, then,
provides a unique opportunity to amend ERISA to allow state and local
governments to experiment with their own health care reform agendas.
In general, there are three different policy paths that would achieve this
result. First, federal legislation could drastically alter the preemption clause and
eliminate most of the current jurisprudence by repealing the "relate to" language
in its entirety. Second, section 514 could be amended to carve out a narrower
exception that would permit state and local employer mandates, but would, in
some other respects, leave the preemption scheme largely intact. As discussed
below, this could take a number of forms, relying on existing components of the
statute to craft an exception. Finally, broad and continuing "relate to" preemption
could be supplemented by special exceptions-legislative or administrative-for
particular state or local laws.
Before turning to these options, it is useful to briefly recall the structure of
ERISA section 514, the preemption clause. Subsection 514(a) contains the
infamous "relate to" language, while subsection 514(b) contains a list of
exemptions from preemption-the insurance/banking/securities exception and
the associated "deemer clause," the special exception for Hawaii's employer
140. Amol Navathe et al., Barack Obama's Plan for a Healthy America, Context: Pol'y &
Prac., http://www.contextjoumnal.org/category5.php?article-id=369 (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
141. See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 173-75
(2d ed. 1995) (discussing legislative timing and the importance of a political "window" for
proposed reforms).
142. If the failed 1994 health care reform debates taught anything, it is the importance of
bringing all stakeholders to the table early.
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mandated health insurance law, and many others. 43
A. Repealing "Relate to"
Perhaps the most obvious approach to prevent ERISA preemption of
employer mandates is to simply abandon subsection 514(a)'s "relate to"
language. Following this path, courts would be left to apply traditional field and
conflict preemption principles to determine the permissibility of laws affecting
employee benefits plans. In other words, the Courts would be asked to determine
if there were actual conflicts between ERISA's requirements and a state or local
pay or play law (conflict preemption), or alternatively if the law wandered too far
into an area that Congress intended to occupy (field preemption).144 The
"connection with or reference to" test in its various iterations would be discarded,
and the post-Shaw jurisprudence would be obsolete.
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, in two concurring opinions, have asked the
Court to accomplish this result on its own through a narrow construction of the
514(a) language. 45 It is perhaps conceivable that the Court could overrule nearly
three decades of ERISA holdings, and Scalia has had some success in convincing
Justices Breyer and Stevens of the merits of this argument.146 However, given the
norm of strong statutory stare decisis and Congress's repeated reliance on the
Court's current approach,1 47 specific legislative action seems like a much more
appropriate reform tool. Congress could replace the existing "relate to" language
in subsection 514(a) with text that clearly indicates the intent Scalia describes.
For instance, the statute might be amended as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006). Subsection (d) reiterates that no federal law is preempted and
subsection (e) ensures that automatic contribution laws are not prohibited by the states.
144. See supra note 33.
145. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring); Cal. Div. Labor
Standards & Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 336 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("I think it would greatly assist our function of clarifying the law if we simply
acknowledged that our first take on this statute was wrong; that the 'relate to' clause of the pre-
emption provision is meant, not to set forth a test for pre-emption, but rather to identify the field in
which ordinary field pre-emption applies-namely, the field of laws regulating employee benefit
plans .... ") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
146. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Like Justice Scalia, I believe that
we should apply normal conflict pre-emption and field pre-emption principles where, as here, a
state statute covers ERISA and non-ERISA documents alike.").
147. See generally Richard Sorian & Judith Feder, Why We Need a Patients' Bill of Rights, 24
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1137 (1999) (describing how the proposed Patients' Bill of Rights
legislation relied on the Court's current interpretations of ERISA preemption).
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laws insofar as they may new ' r he eafter-relate to any emplyee benefit plan
described in seetion 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under seetion 1003(b)
Of this itle that conflict with or otherwise impede the operation of this
subchapter, subchapter H of this chapter, or subchapter III of this chapter.148
One might argue that it would be better to simply repeal section 514, leaving
ERISA without an express preemption clause, and relying on the courts to apply
field and conflict preemption on their own. However, such an approach creates
serious problems given the exceptions to preemption carved out in subsection
514(b) and the other preemption guidance appearing in subsections 514(d) and
(e). 149 Indeed, despite the confusing "relate to" language, other parts of ERISA
preemption clause offer sensible instructions and should be left intact. Therefore,
it is wise to use an amended subsection 514(a) to set a general tone for
preemption and allow the remainder of the statute to build around that.
Still this approach poses significant drawbacks. To begin, ERISA plans have
legitimate concerns regarding administrative uniformity. In a labor market that is
increasingly freed from geographic limitations, the administrative costs of
complying with myriad state and local laws (reaching well beyond health
benefits) could be tremendous. Field preemption principles would provide some
limit to state regulation, especially within a statute that clearly evinces the need
for administrative simplicity,' 50 but there would undoubtedly be tremendous
uncertainty. For instance, states would obviously be barred from regulating
appeals from pension denials, since there is a large body of ERISA law on the
subject, but appeals related to health insurance denial would be in uncertain
waters. Furthermore, uncertainty itself is an important drawback to this approach.
Preemption jurisprudence is notoriously unpredictable. Inviting a new generation
of state law in a field that has been largely closed to state regulations for more
than thirty years will cause confusion. On balance, these drawbacks may be
outweighed by a legislative conclusion that "relate to" preemption was a failed
experiment, but it is important to explore more limited alternatives.
B. A Statutory Space for Pay or Play
Rather than eliminating "relate to" and all of the associated jurisprudence, it
may be more feasible or more desirable to simply carve out a narrower exception
that allows state and local governments to experiment with pay or play statutes.
There are three potential ways to create such an exception-bifurcating
subsection 514(a) to separate pension plans and welfare benefit plans, expanding
148. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
149. Id. § 1144(b), (d)-(e).
150. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) ("The purpose of ERISA is to
provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.").
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the insurance/banking/securities exception in subsection 514(b), or expanding the
"compliance plan" exception. Each of these approaches is discussed below.
1. Pensions Plans and Welfare Benefit Plans
One way to create an exception for state employer mandates would be to
focus on the different kinds of benefits regulated under the statute. Recall that
ERISA regulates two broad categories: pension plans and welfare benefit plans.
Pension plans provide post-retirement income to former employees and therefore
require a complex set of rules governing how benefits accrue and vest over the
course of an employee's career. Indeed, ERISA's 1974 enactment was motivated
by the desire to create comprehensive national standards to ensure that pension
funds were sustainably and fairly administered, and to provide a federal
guarantee of pension plans' solvency.1 51 Welfare benefit plans, on the other hand,
include temporary benefits like health insurance and life insurance. While there
was certainly some perceived need for federal regulation in this area, the
substantive provisions of ERISA place far fewer burdens on welfare benefit plans
than they do on pension plans.1
52
Yet, section 514's preemption scheme applies equally to pension and
welfare benefit plans. The Third Circuit has reasoned that "it is unlikely that
Congress intentionally created this so called 'regulatory vacuum,' in which it
displaced state-law regulation of welfare benefit plans while providing no federal
,,153substitute. Professor Conison has offered a convincing account of the origins
of this approach. 54 Conison argues that Congress was primarily concerned with
fiduciary issues like pension plan vesting and funding, but the inclusion of
welfare benefit plans in the broad preemption language was nonetheless
intentional. 55 In particular, a 1974 state court ruling in Missouri affecting
welfare benefit plans and subjecting them to state insurance regulation 56
sensitized ERISA's drafters to the "potential for state interference with the
proposed law."'' 57 Thus, Congress was aware of the impact that subsection 514(a)
would have on regulation of welfare benefit plans and deliberately elected such
an approach.
Despite original congressional intent, however, it is relatively easy to build a
151. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 77-89.
152. Id. at 90-92.
153. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 467 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring).
154. Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1994).
155. See id. at 646-650.
156. State ex rel. Farmer v. Monsanto Co., 517 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Mo. 1974).
157. Conison, supra note 154, at 648.
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case for treating non-federal regulation of pension plans and welfare benefit
plans differently. Imagine an employee who begins a twenty-year career with a
single employer in Ohio, spends fifteen years working in Michigan, and transfers
to Florida eighteen months before retirement. When this employee retires,
disparate pension regulations in Ohio, Michigan, and Florida could cause
profound uncertainty and conflict over the terms of his pension benefits, creating
a strong imperative for federal preemption. However, when the employee seeks
an annual physical under his employer-sponsored health insurance in Ohio,
Michigan, or Florida, there is no conflict.158 His health benefits are only subject
to the regulations of one state at a time, and his transfer out of Michigan
terminates any effect that Michigan law might have on his coverage.
Following this logic, subsection 514(a) could be amended to apply broad
"relate to" preemption to pension plan benefits, but not employee welfare benefit
plans. New language might read:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee pension
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) 1002(2) of this title and not exempt
under section 1003(b) of this title.
With no explicit preemption language affecting ERISA's welfare benefit
plans, traditional field and conflict preemption principles would apply.
Functionally, this approach may be indistinguishable from an effort to remove
the "relate to" language from the statute entirely. All of the major ERISA
preemption cases have considered laws that allegedly "relate to" welfare benefits,
not pensions, and the supremacy of the comprehensive federal scheme in pension
benefit regulation is largely undisputed. Nonetheless, approaching preemption
reform in this way might be more palatable to key ERISA stakeholders, including
employers and plan administrators, because it continues federal preemption in
important parts of the market.
It is important to distinguish this approach from the "reasoned textualism"
approach to preemption under the current statute that has been advocated by
Professor Zelinsky.159 He focuses attention on the distinction between pension
and welfare benefit plans, but he does so in order to draw the preemption
analyses closer together, rather than to separate them from one another. In
particular, a "reasoned textualist" approaches preemption as follows:
[I]f ERISA affirmatively regulates a particular facet of pension plans (e.g., the
employees who must be covered by such plans), the combination of section 514
158. Cf LANGBEINET AL., supra note 32, at 118-19 (providing a similar example).
159. See Zelinsky, supra note 44, at 808.
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and ERISA's silence on that subject as to welfare plans consigns that subject to
employer autonomy. Thus, as to a state law impacting upon the substance of
welfare plans, the Court should ask whether such law intrudes upon the zone of
employer autonomy defined by reference to ERISA's regulation of pension
plans. If the challenged state law intrudes upon the zone of employer autonomy
so defined, the law is ERISA-preempted and the zone thereby preserved from
state as well as federal regulation.1
60
In other words, the "relate to" language is used to broadly define the field of
regulation occupied by ERISA with respect to welfare plans. If Congress chose
to regulate an aspect of pension benefits but left welfare benefits unregulated in
that area, then any state or local law touching on welfare benefits in that way
must be ERISA preempted. On the other hand, if the law affects an aspect of
welfare benefit plans for which Congress is also silent with respect to pension
benefits, the law is permissible. This "reasoned textualist" approach, whatever its
merits, undoubtedly leaves most pay or play laws preempted.16 1 These laws
mandate employer contributions to certain benefit plans and therefore
impermissibly affect employer action. By contrast, the approach described above
detangles pension and welfare benefit plan preemption, focusing the inquiry only
on the way in which Congress separately regulates each type of benefit, and
creates broader space for pay or play legislation.
2. Insurance/Banking/Securities Exception
Separating pensions from welfare benefit plans, while technically leaving the
"relate to" language partially intact, still creates a tremendously large exception
for regulation of all welfare benefit plans. A narrower change to ERISA's
preemption language might focus more specifically on employers' health
insurance benefits. A logical approach begins with subsection 514(b)(2)'s
insurance/banking/securities exception. This language allows states to "regulate[]
insurance, banking, or securities," but with one important caveat-no ERISA-
covered plan shall itself be subject to state regulation of insurance, banking, or
securities. 62 This limitation, codified in the "deemer clause," has created a
surprisingly large loophole, allowing employers to "self-insure" rather than
purchase insurance products, thus exempting them from state insurance
regulation. Without digressing too far into the health insurance and HMO
controversies of the late 1990s and early 2000s, it is worth noting that ERISA
and its deemer clause played a central role in states' early inability to effectively
160. Id. at 840.
161. See id. at 845-46 (discussing District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506
U.S. 125 (1992)); see also Zelinsky, supra note 85, at 232.
162. See 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(2) (2006).
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regulate HMOs in the face of consumer complaints.163 The proposed federal
"Patients Bill of Rights" was one reaction to this gap in regulation, but subtle,
post-Travelers changes in ERISA jurisprudence eventually alleviated some,
though not all, of this tension. 164 This conflict undoubtedly lies in the background
of any attempt to rework subsection 514(b)(2).
Nonetheless, carefully targeted modifications could extend this statutory
language to include pay or play statutes. Combined with changes to section 514's
definitional section, the subsection could be amended as follows:
(b) Construction and application . . . . (2)(A) Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or
relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities, or which requires provision of health care benefits. (B)
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title,
which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan
established primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust
established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in
the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust
companies, or investment companies....
(c) Definitions. For purposes of this section .... (3) The term "health care
benefits" shall include benefits provided under an employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title, only insofar as those benefits affect
the protection or maintenance of a beneficiary 's health or wellness.
This language allows states to do two things. First, they can require that
employers make minimum health care expenditures or provide a minimum
guarantee of health care coverage. This sort of revision does indeed create a
broad safe harbor for employer mandates, allowing broad and creative state
experimentation. At the same time, this language also reaches a very different
kind of state regulation. Under the proposal, states can require that employers
cover certain benefits, like pregnancy or vaccinations-requirements that have
long been applied to standalone insurers, but that self-insured employers have
been able to avoid through ERISA's deemer clause. 165 While this is certainly a
controversial extension of states' regulatory power, this approach creates a
sensible expansion.
The language above does include important limitations on states' new
163. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 32.
164. See Covington, supra note 91, at 6.
165. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 770.
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authority. First, the proposed language exempts only state laws that "require the
provision of' health benefits, not laws which "regulate" those benefits, thus
limiting the extent to which states can affect plan conduct. Furthermore, the
proposed revision leaves the actual text of the deemer clause intact, even while
neutralizing some of its effects. Nonetheless, under this scheme, self-insured
employers continue to be exempt from state regulations affecting the "business"
of health insurance (e.g., solvency requirements), 66 and states are only able to
reach the substantive content of self-insured health plans in the same way that
they regulate standalone insurance. At the same time, the definitional language in
subsection 514(c)(3) could be narrowed, perhaps excluding mental health
benefits and eschewing the controversial debate over mental health parity (e.g.,
"protection or maintenance of a beneficiary's physical health or wellness"), or
otherwise limiting the scope of the exception. Finally, note that, unlike solutions
described above, this language applies only to states, not localities, and schemes
like the one in San Francisco would continue to risk ERISA preemption.
Further, the interests lined up to support the deemer clause-large employers
and most insurers-are substantial, and narrowing the loophole subjects them to
a vast body of state regulation. While this may be entirely justifiable from a
policy perspective, it may be politically infeasible, or it may simply be a battle
that reformers choose not to fight. In that case, there is a third approach that
would extend an even narrower safe harbor to certain kinds of employer
mandates. As discussed below, this proposal does not rely on an amendment to
section 514 and instead proceeds from the "compliance plan" exception in
ERISA's general definitional section.
3. Compliance Plan Exception
Broadly speaking, not all kinds of employee benefits are regulated under
ERISA. Laws affecting benefits that are unregulated are therefore not preempted,
for they do not "relate to" any ERISA-governed subject matter. 167 For instance,
"excess benefit plans," which provide benefits beyond some ERISA
requirements, are outside the regulatory scheme; 68 governments are free to
regulate these plans as they choose.169 Leveraging this feature of the statute relies
on amending ERISA so that benefits provided to comply with state and local pay
166. Regulation on the "business" of health insurance includes provisions creating minimum
asset requirements or creating fiduciary responsibilities, exactly the sort of regulation ERISA was
meant to preempt.
167. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (preempting state laws that "relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section
1003(b) [ERISA section 403(b)] of this title") (emphasis added).
168. See id. §§ 1002(36), 1003(b)(5).
169. Seeid. § 1144(a).
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or play laws are not considered regulated welfare benefits. While this may seem
improbable, given that health insurance benefits are a central ERISA-governed
welfare benefit plan, the Act does open up a narrow opportunity for action.
Specifically, subsection 403(b)(3), known as the "compliance plan"
exception, provides:
(b) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee benefit
plan if... (3) such plan is maintained solely for the purpose of complying with
applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or
disability insurance laws .... 170
This language leaves the states and localities free to design workers
compensation and unemployment benefit schemes, with mandated employer
contributions, without risking ERISA preemption. Pay or play laws could
potentially be worked into this framework, though the result would necessarily
limit the form of state and local regulation. Following this approach, subsection
403(b)(3) could be amended to read as follows:
(b) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee benefit
plan if ... (3) such plan is maintained solely for the purpose of complying with
applicable workmen's compensation laws, or-unemployment compensation or
disability insurance laws, or health care contribution laws ....
Under this exception, governments could design stand-alone "health care
contribution" programs and require employer provision of benefits without
coming under ERISA's umbrella. However, this sort of scheme would look very
different from employer mandates that state and local governments have recently
enacted. Note that the exception applies only to plans that are maintained
"solely" to comply with relevant laws. Pay or play laws, on the other hand, have
tended to look to employer contributions under existing ERISA-covered health
care benefit plans. If non-federal health care reform is going to escape
preemption through the compliance plan exception, then new forms of employer
mandates will need to be developed.
The Massachusetts health care reform statute suggests one design that may
be effective. Under that law, employers who choose to "pay" are not assessed a
fixed per-employee fee, but are instead required to compensate the state for a
percentage of the uncompensated health care sought by their employees.' 7 1 A
statute that placed a similar assessment on employers across the state could be
designed so that contributions were funneled into a plan "maintained solely for
170. Id. § 1003(b) (2006).
171. See An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care § 44,
2006 Mass. Acts 77, 111-13.
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the purpose of complying."'' 72 Thus, while not technically creating an employer
mandate, this approach would accomplish the same result, since individuals
generally seek uncompensated care only if they lack employer-provided
insurance.
Approaching pay or play preemption in this way has tremendous practical
advantages-it creates a narrow exception that only reaches a very specific kind
of statute. Yet it also drastically limits how governments design their reform
programs, potentially placing off-limits many innovative public-private
partnership approaches providing expanded access to health insurance. By
requiring that pay or play statutes operate from an employer benefit that exists
"solely" to comply with state or local law, new regulation might arguably be
more disruptive by requiring the establishment of new kinds of benefits.
C. Case by Case De-Preemption
None of the narrow approaches described above are entirely satisfactory-
the more expansive safe harbors may be impossible to enact and may risk
intolerable uncertainty, while the more limited approaches may be too restrictive
to allow effective experimentation. Similarly, repealing the "relate to" language
may prove unwise or insurmountably challenging. The third potential policy
path, case by case de-preemption of particular laws, certainly does not escape
these concerns. Instead, it may recombine the trade-offs in a different way, thus
creating an alternative set of opportunities for reformers.
This Section describes two somewhat related tools for achieving such case
by case de-preemption, where federal actors evaluate particular state and local
pay or play laws and exempt them from ERISA preemption at their discretion. It
begins by describing a purely legislative approach based on ERISA's exception
for the state of Hawaii and then explores how this approach might be modified in
light of the Clean Air Act's scheme for establishing fuel economy standards for
consumer vehicles. It then sketches the outline of a more comprehensive and
flexible scheme based on federal agency discretion.
1. The Hawaii Route
In 1974, shortly before ERISA was enacted, Hawaii's state legislature
passed the Prepaid Health Care Act of 1974, effectively requiring employers to
pay at least fifty percent of their employees' health care costs. 173 The Hawaii
statute reaches beyond even the most ambitious proposals in the modern debate,
covering any employee working more than twenty hours a week, and capping
172. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (2006).
173. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 393-13 (LexisNexis 2004).
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employee contributions to insurance premiums at 1.5% of their salary.' 74 In a
1980 decision that was affirmed by the Supreme Court per curiam, the Ninth
Circuit held the statute preempted by ERISA. 75 Two years later, after an
aggressive campaign by Hawaii's congressional leadership, 176 Congress amended
ERISA's preemption clause to specifically exclude the Hawaii statute. 177 The
exception only extends to the statute as crafted in 1974 and does not allow
Hawaii to modify its program in any way. 78 Therefore, Hawaii employers are
still required to comply with the state's broad health care coverage mandate;
however, any other state attempting to replicate the program would face certain
ERISA preemption.
Some have argued that Massachusetts should explore a similar legislative
exception for its own health care reform program. 79 While the state's program
has not been challenged in federal court, and observers continue to argue that the
law is effectively tailored to escape ERISA preemption, the threat of preemption
litigation still hangs over administration of the state law. A statutory exception
like Hawaii's would eliminate this concern. Of course, given Massachusetts's
tortured efforts to escape ERISA preemption-limiting employers' assessments
to $295 per year and tracking employer data for uncompensated care patients-it
would be ironic to find that these compromises were moot. More importantly, a
Hawaii-like provision would lock Massachusetts into its current program design,
flying in the face of rhetoric touting the program as an experiment in need of
tinkering and modification. 180 And, perhaps most significantly, an exception for
the state of Massachusetts would do nothing to promote employer mandates in
San Francisco, Vermont, and other states and cities contemplating reform. In
fact, a legislative exception for Massachusetts would actually undermine the
argument that other programs were not ERISA-preempted.
Some of these concerns can be better understood by looking to an entirely
unrelated area of federal law: the Clean Air Act's Corporate Average Fuel
174. Id. § 393-3, -13; see also Sylvia A. Law, Health Care in Hawai'i: An Agenda for
Research and Reform, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 206-07 (2000) (attributing Hawaii's broad coverage
to numerous factors, including decades of Democratic political control and the state's unique
cultural history).
175. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), affd. mem., 454 U.S.
801 (1981).
176. Shelley K. Hubner, State "Pay or Play'" Employer Mandates: Prescribed or Preempted?,
HEALTH L., Aug. 2008, at 15, 19.
177. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5) (2006).
178. See id. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(ii).
179. David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 55
U. KAN. L. REv. 1103, 1110 (2007). The same logic certainly applies to programs in Vermont, San
Francisco, and other places.
180. See id. at 1116-17.
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Efficiency (CAFE) Standards, governing fuel efficiency standards for
automakers.181 In 1970, Congress created the first federal standards for consumer
automobiles. In the process, legislators were forced to grapple with the fact that
California had already adopted its own more stringent standards for cars sold
within its boundaries.1 82 The compromise that emerged allowed California to
keep its own standards, and to amend those standards subject to approval by the
Environmental Protection Agency.1 83 Furthermore, other states were free to adopt
the California standards if they chose; they could not, however, create their own
fuel economy standards.
184
By analogy, imagine how the ERISA preemption scheme could adopt some
of these features. The statute could be amended to, first, de-preempt the
Massachusetts law; second, give Hawaii and Massachusetts the option of seeking
federal approval for changes to their statutes; and third, allow other states to
adopt wholesale the Hawaii or Massachusetts programs. But even this brief
thought experiment exposes profound flaws with such an approach in the context
of health care reform. To begin, fuel efficiency standards create a single-variable
regulatory scheme and the core cost-benefit calculation is clear: the cost of dirtier
air against the expense of more efficient cars. Pay or play statutes, on the other
hand, are comprehensive programs that involve dozens, or even hundreds, of
decision points and weigh a daunting array of interests. Fuel efficiency standards
are simply a number, but employer mandate-based health reform affects an entire
system, and an either/or approach in this context is difficult to justify.
Additionally, in the context of CAFE standards, California has some non-
arbitrary claim to special status-it is a large state and its consumers purchase
enough cars to garner substantial market power.18 5 No similar logic applies in the
health care reform debate; Hawaii and Massachusetts are only advantaged
181. See 49 U.S.C. § 32,902 (2006).
182. See Patrick Parenteau, Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way: The States Tackle Climate
Change with Little Help from Washington, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1453, 1466-67 (2008).
183. Until recently, EPA approval was largely considered a rubber-stamp process, and the
EPA had never denied a waiver to California; however, the Bush Administration denied the most
recent application in 2007. See Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, America Receives
a National Solution for Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Dec. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.epa.gov/newsroom/newsreleasese.htm (follow "By Date" hyperlink, then follow
"2007" hyperlink, then navigate to 12/19/2007). In the first week of the new administration,
President Obama ordered the EPA to reconsider the issue. See John M. Broder & Peter Baker,
Obama's Order Is Likely to Tighten Auto Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at Al.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006).
185. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. 727, 732-33 (2008) (discussing the business community's preference for preemption because
of the way it simplifies trade across state lines). Were Nebraska to attempt similar legislation, one
could imagine that automakers would simply refuse to sell cars in the state.
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because of their first-mover status, and there is no particular reason to think that
these programs would work well in other states.1 86 Finally, in the health care
context, this approach would largely eliminate the broad and creative
experimentation that is needed to find meaningful health care reform options.
Indeed, none of this is to suggest that the CAFE model should be seriously
explored in the context of ERISA reform. But it does highlight an alternative to
the statutory reforms discussed in the preceding Section, which attempt to define
a specific sandbox in which non-federal actors can create pay or play structures.
Instead, there are models in the modem administrative system that begin by
preempting state law but nonetheless allow states and localities to advance their
own regulatory interests on a federally-controlled playground. The next
Subsection explores a different, more apt analogy in administrative law and uses
that to trace an approach for amending ERISA section 514.
2. A Role for Federal Agencies
A more workable model would provide state and local governments a
flexible way to seek ERISA de-preemption of health care reform legislation.
Starting with a presumption of today's broad (though somewhat uncertain 87)
ERISA preemption of pay or play statutes, states and localities could apply to a
federal agency, which would then review their program and grant an exception
from preemption. Such a system would give governments the ability to design
flexible programs, while allowing a federal actor to assess the administrative
burden placed on employers. Thus, Massachusetts's comprehensive and carefully
administered statewide reform program could be treated differently than the
haphazard New York City law applying only to employers with more than
12,500 square feet of retail grocery sales.' 88 Moreover, employers would be
provided with clear notice of any non-federal law that may affect their provision
of health care benefits, arguably lessening the administrative complexity for
multi-state employers.
In fact, a 1976 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) statute, the Medical
Device Amendments, 189 operates in a very similar way. The statute provides a
186. See Sidney D. Watson et al., The Road from Massachusetts to Missouri: What Will It
Take for Other States To Replicate Massachusetts Health Reform?, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1331
(2007) (explaining the myriad ways that health reform must vary state-to-state).
187. Cf Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008) (constituting
the only decision upholding a pay or play law).
188. See N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 22-506 (2009), available at
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us (follow "Laws of New York" hyperlink, then follow "ADC"
hyperlink, then navigate to Title 22, Section 506).
189. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 55 and in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for medical devices, and in broad
language preempts any state law governing the "safety or effectiveness" of a
regulated device. 190 However, the statute also provides that the FDA may exempt
laws from preemption, "[u]pon application of a State or a political subdivision"
and review by the agency. 91 Today, the Code of Federal Regulations contains a
long list of exempted state laws.1 92 Like the fuel efficiency standards
compromise, this legislative scheme was born of an era when states entered a
regulatory field before the federal government, and legislators were forced to
design a system that would allow federal supremacy while accommodating
existing state law.'93
There are a number of unresolved questions and substantial problems with
using this approach to create an ERISA de-preemption scheme. First, which
agency would be responsible for administering the program? ERISA largely falls
under the purview of the Department of Labor, but that agency has very little
special expertise in the complex issues affecting employer provision of health
care. Some even argue that the Department's own engagement in ERISA cases is
at least partly responsible for today's complicated ERISA jurisprudence.194
Another choice might be the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS), an office within the Department of Health and Human Services that is
responsible for assessing state compliance with the federal Medicaid statute. 95
States are accustomed to seeking CMS approval for changes to their Medicaid
programs, 196 and pay or play reforms are often coupled with expansion of or
alterations to the state's health care safety net services. 197 Thus, states may
190. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(2) (2006).
191. Id. § 360k(b) (2006).
192. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (2009).
193. Cf Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction
Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG CoSM. L.J. 511, 526 (1988) (discussing
the history of the MDA).
194. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1113-14 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court's deference to the Department of Labor
in ERISA cases). But see Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008)
(lower court did not defer to the Department of Labor).
195. See Centers for Medicard & Medicaid Services, Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
History (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
196. All states must have a Medicaid "State Plan" on file with CMS, and states must seek
approval for all changes, either as "State Plan Amendments" or federal "waivers." See generally
Julia Gilmore Gaughan, Institutionalization as Discrimination, 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 405, 408-12
(2008) (providing a description of the Medicaid state plan process).
197. See Mark E. Douglas, An Overview of the Recent State Rally for Health Care Reform, 5
IND. HEALTH L. REv. 277, 291-93 (2008) (describing how the Massachusetts reform plan interacts
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already be working with CMS to obtain approval for their reform legislation, and
expanding that process to cover ERISA de-preemption could be a starting point.
However, CMS has no expertise in employee benefits, the private insurance
market, state insurance regulation, or other related issues, making it difficult to
imagine putting the entire process in their hands. One could also envision a
hybrid scheme where CMS evaluates the program and makes a recommendation
to the Department of Labor, in much the same way that the Department of Justice
and Department of Health and Human Services collaborate on the "scheduling"
of drugs under the Controlled Substances Act.' 98
Yet even if one resolves the question of agency authority, there is still the
vexing concern of inappropriate agency politicization of these decisions. After
all, both of the de-preemption schemes discussed above-CAFE standards and
the MDA-have been thrust into newspaper headlines and federal courts in
recent years, as state and private actors allege that the agency involved has
asserted its authority in impermissible ways. 199 One of the goals of pay or play
reforms is to fill gaps at the interstices of federal health care reform, and inserting
the federal bureaucracy into these decisions may frustrate this aim.
Finally, any system of federal agency de-preemption would require statutory
criteria by which state or local programs could be evaluated. This forces a
conversation about the specific goals of ERISA preemption, and reaching a
consensus may be even more politically challenging than the legislative reforms
discussed above. Furthermore, statutory criteria would need to draw boundaries
around the type of state or local law that would be eligible for de-preemption. If
the option is targeted to only reach the archetypal employer mandate,
experimentation may be unnecessarily closed, but a broader focus may make de-
preemption administratively impossible. Nonetheless, despite all of these
concerns, an administrative de-preemption scheme creates a possible alternative
and may allow more middle ground than a purely statutory change.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that most state and local pay or play laws are
preempted by ERISA. Even when health care reform is tailored to survive a
challenge, the preemption jurisprudence places such hurdles in front of program
design that it impedes the ability to create flexible and creative reform structures.
As health care reform is thrust into the national spotlight, legislators are
with the Medicaid program).
198. See 21 U.S.C § 811 (b) (2000).
199. See Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999, 1012 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(discussing the MDA and FDA's de-preemption authority); Broder & Baker, supra note 183
(discussing the California CAFE controversy).
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presented with an opportunity to amend ERISA's preemption clause as part of a
health care reform bill, yet little attention has been paid to the contours of such
legislative reform. Thus, this Note has proposed and analyzed a number of
specific amendments that would allow health care reform at the state and local
level.
One obvious possibility is to simply remove the controversial "relate to"
language from the statute and leave ERISA to traditional field and conflict
preemption principles.200 Another approach continues expansive "relate to"
preemption for ERISA regulation of pension plans, but leaves state and local law
affecting welfare benefit plans without an express preemption clause. 0'
Alternatively, reforms could graft new exceptions onto existing components of
ERISA's preemption clause-the insurance/banking/securities exception,20 2 or
the compliance plan exception.20 3 State and local governments could also seek
specific congressional amendments exempting their particular employer
mandates, as Hawaii did in 1982.204 Finally, the Note explored a proposal for
ERISA de-preemption moderated by a federal agency.20 5
Each of these proposals has different advantages. Abandoning the "relate to"
language, in its entirety or as applied to welfare benefit plans, is the only
alternative that offers states and localities complete flexibility in program design.
Yet these approaches may place intolerable administrative burdens on employers
and may be politically impossible. At the same time, more targeted and
politically palatable reforms-including modification of the compliance plan
exception or agency-based de-preemption-may so constrain the design of pay or
play reforms that they are hardly better than the current scheme. Administrative
de-preemption is further hampered by program complexity and important
questions about its feasibility, but if successfully implemented, it could provide a
compromise option that promoted state and local experimentation while
satisfying some employer concerns.
Perhaps the best alternative is to add health care reform to the
insurance/banking/securities exception. The types of employer mandates covered
by this change are reasonably broad, but employers are exposed to state
regulation in a more narrow and predictable area. This proposal has the further
advantage of mitigating some of the more pernicious concerns associated with
employers' use of the "deemer clause" to escape state regulation of health
200. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519
U.S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); supra Section II.A.
201. See supra Subsection II.B. 1.
202. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
203. See supra Subsection II.B.3.
204. See supra Subsection II.C. 1.
205. See supra Subsection II.C.2.
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insurance benefits, °6 though that fact in and of itself may pose political
difficulties.
Indeed, it is hardly obvious where negotiations to amend ERISA's
preemption clause will lead. The process will have to tackle concerns that reach
well beyond the context of pay or play health care reform, and those topics are
outside the scope of this Note. But if nothing else, this begins a conversation
about how ERISA can be amended by placing possibilities on the table and
providing a sense of the trade-offs and concerns in play. And the time for action
is now: presented with a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reform our health
care system, national leaders can make it possible for states to pick up where
their efforts leave off. Through swift action, Congress can ensure that state and
local governments are empowered to create successes from whatever small
failures the national health reform project is forced to endure.
206. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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